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Willis: Tort Law: Pre-Trial Settlements and Post-Trial Liability

TORT LAW: PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENTS AND
POST-TRIAL LIABILITY
Wells v. TallahasseeMemorial Regional Medical Center,
659 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1995)
Jill N. Willis*
The petitioner, Joyce Wells, filed suit against the respondent,
Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center (TMRMC), and four
other defendants for the wrongful death of her husband.' Prior to trial,
petitioner reached a settlement with the four other defendants, leaving
respondent as the sole defendant going to trial.2 However, at the close
of the case, the names of the settling defendants appeared on the verdict
form and the jury was instructed to apportion fault among all the
original defendants.3 The jury returned a verdict for petitioner, assessing
damages at $573,853 and finding respondent 90% at fault and two of
the other four defendants a total of 10% at fault.' The trial court
awarded petitioner 90% of this sum, plus costs, and less social security
benefits.5
Respondent moved to reduce the judgment by setting off the total
amount paid by the settling defendants.6 The trial court rejected
respondent's argument and denied the requested setoff.7 The Florida
First District Court of Appeal reversed,8 but certified two questions to
the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether, in cases tried under
Florida Statutes section 768.81(3), Florida's comparative negligence
statute, a non-settling defendant is entitled to setoff based upon sums
* In honor of Janet Cole Willis.
1. Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr., 659 So. 2d 249,250 (Fla. 1995)
[hereinafter Wells 11].

2. Id. The total amount of the settlement was $300,000. Id.
3. Id. at 250 & n.1.
4. Id. at 250. The jury found that petitioner suffered $202,853 in economic damages and

$371,000 in noneconomic damages. Id.
5. Id.

6.Id.
7. Id.
8. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr. v. Wells, 634 So. 2d 655, 659-60 (Fla.
1st DCA 1994) [hereinafter Wells I]. On appeal, respondent argued that FLA. STAT. §§
46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5) (1991) mandated a setoff in the amount paid by the settling
defendants, notwithstanding the abolition of joint and several liability as to noneconomic
damages as provided in FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1991). Id. at 656-57, 656 n.4. The appellate court
accepted the respondent's argument and found footnote three of Fabre v. Main, 623 So. 2d
1182, 1186 n.3 (Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Fabre I1], controlling. Wells 1, 634 So. 2d at 658.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

paid by settling defendants in excess of their apportioned liability and,
if so, whether the rule applies equally to both economic and noneconomic damages.9 The Florida Supreme Court reversed and HELD,
that the "setoff statutes"'" do not apply to non-economic damages; with
regard to economic damages, the settlement proceeds should be divided
between economic and non-economic damages in the same proportion

9. Wells 1, 634 So. 2d at 659-60.
10. Wells 11, 659 So. 2d at 252-53. The statutes that the court refers to as "setoff statutes"
are FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5) (1989).
Section 46.015 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A written covenant not to sue or release of a person who is or may be jointly
and severally liable with other persons for a claim shall not release or discharge
the liability of any other person who may be liable for the balance of such claim.
(2) At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not to sue to any person in partial
satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the
amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the
time of rendering judgment.
FLA. STAT.

§ 46.015(1), (2) (1989).

Section 768.041 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A release or covenant not to sue as to one tortfeasor for the property damage
to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to
release or discharge the liability of any other tortfeasor who may be liable for the
same tort or death.
(2) At trial, if any defendant shows the court that the plaintiff, or any person
lawfully on his behalf, has delivered a release or covenant not to sue to any person,
firm, or corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall
set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would
be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment
accordingly ....
FLA. STAT.

§ 768.041(1), (2) (1989).

Section 768.31 provides, in relevant part:
(5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE.-When a release or a covenant
not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more
persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in
the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.
FLA. STAT.

§ 768.31(5), (5)(a) (1989).
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as the jury's award and only that part of the settlement proceeds
apportioned to economic damages should be set off against that part of
the jury's award apportioned to economic damages.'"
Historically, Florida courts abided by the doctrine of contributory
negligence, 2 which prevented a plaintiff from recovering damages if
the plaintiff's negligence was in any way responsible for the accident. 3
Florida courts also recognized the doctrine of joint and several
liability, 4 but did not recognize the right of contribution among joint
tortfeasors. In 1973, Florida receded from the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence and began to equate liability with fault. 5 Two
years later, the Florida Supreme Court abolished the rule against
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 6
Although this adoption of contribution among joint tortfeasors
eliminated some of the inequities associated with joint and several
liability, it failed to provide for situations in which defendants with low
percentages of fault were forced to satisfy an entire judgment because
other defendants were either insolvent or were not parties to the
action. 7 In 1986, the legislature enacted section 768.81(3),"8 which
11. Wells II, 659 So. 2d at 253-54. The jury found the total amount of damages to be
$573,853, including $202,853 in econorfc damages and $371,000 in non-economic damages.
Id. at 250. The economic damages represented 35.349% of the total award. Id. at 254 & n.3.
Thus, 35.349% of the $300,000 settlement, or $106,047, is set off against the award for
economic damages. Id. Respondent was responsible for the full 90% of non-economic damages,
or $333,900. Id.
12. Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1184 (citing Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080
(Fla. 1987)). Contributory negligence is defined as "conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451 (5th ed. 1984).
13. Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1184 (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla.
700 (1886)); see KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 65, at 451.
14. Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1184 (citing Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1080).
15. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973). In that case, the court stated: "If
fault is to remain the test of liability, then the doctrine of comparative negligence which involves
apportionment of the loss among those whose fault contributed to the occurrence is more
consistent with liability based on a fault premise." Id.
16. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 391 (Fla. 1975). In Lincenberg, the court noted
that with the adoption of comparative negligence, there was no longer any justification for
denying fault allocation as between negligent defendants. Id. The court stated that "it would be
undesirable for this court to retain a rule that under a system based on fault, casts the entire
burden of a loss for which several may be responsible upon only one of those at fault ... ." Id.
The court retained the doctrine of joint and several liability, however, stating that the negligence
attributed to the defendants should be apportioned on a pro rata basis without consideration to
varying degrees of fault and noting that the defendants remain jointly and severally liable for
the entire amount. Id. at 393-94.
17. See, e.g., Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1987). In that case,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

abolished the joint and several liability doctrine and adopted the
comparative negligence doctrine as to non-economic damages. 9
However, section 768.81(3) created a whole new series of questions for
courts to answer, such as how a pre-trial settlement which exceeds the
settling defendant's apportioned damages affects the liability of a nonsettling defendant.
In 1983, a New Mexico court addressed this very question in Wilson
v. Gait.2" In Wilson, the parents and the conservator of an infant sued
three physicians and a hospital for damages allegedly resulting from
negligent treatment and care of the infant.2 Prior to trial, the plaintiffs
settled with the hospital and one of the doctors, and the case proceeded
to trial against the other two doctors.22 The amount paid by the settling
defendants exceeded the total amount of damages as determined by the
jury.23 The trial court held that the plaintiffs could not recover any
additional amounts, as a matter of law, because the settlement amount
already exceeded the total award.24
On appeal, the court reviewed existing law, particularly the impact
of a recent case abolishing joint and several liability.25 With the

the plaintiff, who sustained injuries on a Walt Disney World attraction, was found 14% at fault,
her fiance 85% at fault, and Disney 1% at fault. Id. at 199. The plaintiff subsequently married
her fiance and so the plaintiff was unable to recover from her husband under the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity, see, e.g., Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1184, and the court entered
judgment against Disney for 86% of the damages. Wood,515 So. 2d at 199. The court found
Lincenberg to be controlling. Id. at 200. The court refused to judicially eliminate joint and
several liability and therefore approved the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
finding Disney responsible for 86% of the damages. Id. at 202.
18. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1991) provides:
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.-In cases to which this section applies, the
court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's
percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several
liability; provided that with respect to any party whose percentage of fault equals
or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter judgment with respect
to economic damages against that party on the basis of the doctrine of joint and
several liability.
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1989).
19. See Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
20. 668 P.2d 1104, 1107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
21. Id.at 1107.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.at 1108. The Wilson court analyzed the effect of the holding of Bartlett v. New
Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 648 P.2d 794
(N.M. 1982). The Bartlett court held that "U]oint and several liability is not to be retained in
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abolition of joint and several liability, the court noted there was no
longer any basis for contribution among concurrent tortfeasors.26 The
court addressed the issue of whether non-settling defendants must pay
their apportioned share of damages when a plaintiff has already settled
with one or more settling defendants for an amount in excess of the total
damages." The court held that the most suitable approach is to allow
the plaintiff to recover the apportioned damages from each severallyliable defendant without reduction." The court reasoned that this
approach would allow settling defendants to buy their peace and would
discourage non-settling defendants from taking advantage of the good
faith efforts of settling defendants.29
In Espinoza v. Machonga,3° a California court also addressed the
issue of how a settlement with one defendant affects the amount for
which a non-settling defendant is liable.31 In Espinoza, the plaintiff
sued a housing authority and another defendant for injuries caused by
the shattering of a glass door.32 Before trial, the plaintiff settled with
the housing authority, and the case proceeded against the other
defendant.33 The superior court held that the non-settling defendant was
responsible for his full share of non-economic damages without
setoff.34
The appellate court affirmed the decision, noting that a recent
statutory change had abolished joint and several liability as to noneconomic damages;35 therefore, each defendant is solely responsible for

our pure comparative negligence system ...... Id. at 585.
26. Wilson, 668 P.2d at 1108.
27. Id. at 1107.
28. Id. at 1109. The court rejected the possibility of reviving the common law rule that
the release of one tortfeasor releases all others. Id. at 1108. The court also rejected an approach
which would allow contribution among concurrent tortfeasors and, therefore, would permit the
settling defendant to seek contribution for any amount paid in settlement in excess of the
defendant's apportioned damages from other defendants who failed to settle. Id. at 1108-09. The
court pointed out that "this approach offers little incentive for the injured person to settle with
one or fewer than all of the tortfeasors." Id. at 1109.
29. Id.
30. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).

31. Id. at 500.
32. Id. at 499.

33. Id. After the housing authority settled with the plaintiff, the case against the other
defendant went to judicial arbitration. Id.

34. Id. at 500.
35. Id. at 501. Section 1431.2(a) of the California Civil Code (1986) provides:
(a) In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, based
upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for noneconomic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant
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his or her share of non-economic damages, and non-economic damages
are not subject to setoff.36 With respect to economic damages, the
Espinoza court allocated the settlement between economic and noneconomic damages in the same proportion that the final damage award
was allocated between economic and non-economic damages.37 Then,
the court set off only the economic portion of the settlement against the
economic portion of the final award for damages.38
This issue was not addressed in Florida until the 1993 case of Fabre
v. Marin,3 9 in which the Florida Supreme Court, in dicta, discussed the
issue of whether a pre-trial settlement would be setoff against a nonsettling defendant's apportioned share of liability.' In Fabre II, the
plaintiff alleged that she sustained injuries when the car in which she
was a passenger was cut off by the car driven by Mrs. Fabre and was
forced into a guardrail.4' The defendants requested that the court draft
the verdict form so as to include the drivers of both cars,42 even though
the driver of the plaintiffs car was the plaintiff's husband and the
plaintiff could not recover from her husband because of the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity.43 The trial judge denied the request.
However, to avoid a retrial if this denial proved erroneous on appeal, the
judge submitted the issue of the plaintiffs husband's negligence to the
jury for a post-trial determination.' The jury found each driver 50%
at fault.45
On appeal, the issue was whether the liability for non-economic
damages should be apportioned on the basis of fault, even though the
plaintiff could not recover from her husband.46 The appellate court

shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that
defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a
separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.
Id. at 500.
36. Espinoza, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504. The court noted that to do otherwise would be to
treat the settlement money as if it were paid as a joint liability. Id.
37. See id. In Espinoza, there was no jury award per se. The award amount and the
percentages of fault for the housing authority, the other defendant, and the plaintiff himself were
determined by judicial arbitration. Id. at 499.
38. Id. at 504.
39. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) (Fabre If).
40. Id. at 1186 n.3.
41. Id. at 1183.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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below, in construing Florida's comparative negligence statute4 had
found that the statute is ambiguous, and had concluded that the
legislature intended to apportion liability only among defendants who
were present in the lawsuit.4" The Florida Supreme Court granted
review based upon the appellate court's certified conflict with a Fifth
District Court of Appeal case.49 The court quashed the decision of the
appellate court and approved the Fifth District Court of Appeal decision,
thus allowing the jury to apportion liability among all tortfeasors50 In
so doing, the court stated that requiring plaintiffs to take defendants as
they find them better reflects the legislative intent behind the comparative negligence statute5 1
Although the Fabre II court resolved the issue of the role of nonparties in apportioning damages,52 it did not resolve the issue of how
and when pre-trial settlements will be set off against the damages apportioned to a non-settling defendant. The Fabre H court discussed this
issue in dicta in a footnote to its opinion." The court suggested that a

47. Fabre v. Marin, 597 So. 2d 883, 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) [hereinafter Fabre 1]; see
supra note 18.
48. Fabre 1,597 So. 2d at 885-86. The court below had reasoned that, in abrogating joint
and several liability, the court did not intend to prevent a faultless plaintiff from recovering the
total amount of damages. Id.
49. FabreII, 623 So. 2d at 1183; see Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610, 612
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that the purpose of Florida's comparative negligence statute, FLA.
STAT. § 768.81(2), was to abrogate joint and several liability completely as to non-economic
damages and that, therefore, to exclude from the apportionment of fault as to non-economic
damages an entity that is at least partly at fault, merely because the entity is not a party to the
action, would be to thwart the intent of the legislature).
50. Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1186-87.
51. Id. at 1186.
52. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
53. Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1186 n.3. The footnote states:
3. Thus, we reject the argument that our interpretation of section 768.81(3) when
coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double
reduction in the amount of damages. This possibility may beoavoided by applying
the setoff contemplated by section 768.31(5) against the total damages (reduced by
any comparative negligence of the plaintiff) rather than against the apportioned
damages caused by a particular defendant. For example, suppose defendant A is
released from the suit for a settlement of $60,000 and the case goes to trial against
defendant B. The jury returns a verdict finding the plaintiff's comparative
negligence to be 40%, the negligence of A and B to be 30% each, and the damages
to be $300,000. Because the $60,000 setoff would not reduce the plaintiff's
$180,000 to below $90,000, B would still have to pay the full $90,000 for his share
of the liability. Of course, if the damages were found to be $150,000, the $60,000
from the settlement with A would be set off against the plaintiff's $90,000
recovery which would mean that B's obligation would be reduced from $45,000
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settlement amount should be set off against the entire amount of
damages, not against the non-settling defendant's apportioned share
alone.54 The non-settling defendant would then pay his apportioned
share of the damages only to the extent that the total damages, minus
the settlement amount, has left that share unpaid."
In the instant case, the appellate court below found footnote three of
Fabre II to be controlling.56 The Florida Supreme Court, however,
receded from footnote three of Fabre II, holding that the setoff provisions57 do not apply to non-economic damages." The court reasoned
that the setoff statutes apply only to situations in which a party is
subject to joint and several liability, which would never happen with
respect to non-economic damages under the comparative negligence
statute." Additionally, the court held that the way to apportion
settlement proceeds between economic and non-economic damages is to
base the allocation on the jury verdict.'
In receding from footnote three of Fabre I and announcing the
proper application of the comparative negligence statute with respect to
the setoff statutes, the court finally provided some guidance as to how
settlements will affect subsequent judgments against non-settling
defendants. The court's decision reflected a desire to encourage the
settlement process and to retain pre-trial settlements as a desirable
alternative to pursuing claims to trial." Additionally, the court's
decision sought to reconcile the language of Florida's setoff statutes 62
with the language of Florida's comparative negligence statute.63 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Anstead expressed concern as to the
continued viability of the setoff statutes in light of the court's interpretation of the comparative negligence statute.' 4 Justice Anstead noted that
the setoff statutes, which are part of the legislative contribution scheme,

to $30,000.
Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
Ct. App.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Wells 1, 634 So. 2d at 658.
See Wells 11, 659 So. 2d at 252-53; supra note 10.
Wells IH,659 So. 2d at 253-54; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See Wells 11, 659 So. 2d at 253.
Id. at 254.
See id. at 252 (quoting Hoch v. Allied Signal, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 624 (Cal.
1994)).
See id. at 252-53; supra note 10.
Wells II, 659 So. 2d at 252-53.
Id. at 255-56 (Anstead, J., concurring).
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are no longer necessary,65 thus raising the question as to why the
legislature left the contribution scheme intact.'
Since the instant court found footnote three of Fabre I to be noncontrolling,67 the court instead focused on decisions from other
jurisdictions that had already answered the specific questions before the
instant court.6" The court looked both to a California case that quoted
Wilson and to Espinoza in determining whether setoff would b&
appropriate in cases of several liability.69 The cases from other
jurisdictions upon which the instant court relied persuasively argued that
the application of setoff provisions in situations of several liability
would actually discourage rather than encourage settlement. 0
Firstly, if setoff were allowed, the plaintiff would bear the burden of
a low settlement, but would not reap the benefit of a high one.71
Secondly, as the Wilson court pointed out, allowing setoff would permit
non-settling defendants to take advantage of the good faith efforts of
settling defendants.72 This could result in a non-settling defendant
purposely refraining from settlement, hoping that another defendant will
settle for an amount greater than the settling defendant's apportioned
share because the extra amount will be subtracted from the non-settling
defendant's apportioned share.73
In contrast, when setoff is disallowed, the plaintiff, rather than the
non-settling defendant, is allowed to reap the benefits of a high
settlement.74 This approach permits a plaintiff to weigh the possibility
65. Id. Justice Anstead pointed out that "[s]ince the 'problem' of a tortfeasor paying more
than his fair share has been eliminated by the enactment of section 768.81(3), the 'solution' to
the problem by the scheme of contribution and setoff is no longer needed." Id. at 256.
66. Id.

at 251.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 251-52.
69. Id. at 252.
70. Id. See, e.g., Hoch v. Allied Signal, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 623 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (posing that allowing setoff would require plaintiffs to bear the risk of divergence between
the settlement and the apportioned liability without allowing plaintiffs to reap potential benefits
from such divergence and would discourage plaintiffs from settling with independently with
individual defendants); Neil v. Kavena, 859 P.2d 203, 206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
awarding non-settling defendants a windfall from favorable settlements is unfair to plaintiffs and
would encourage defendants to refrain from settling, by offering a hope of reaping benefits from

the plaintiff's settlements with other defendants).
71. Hoch, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624; Neil, 859 P.2d at 206.

72. Wilson, 668 P.2d at 1109.
73. See id.
74. Hoch, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624. The court stated:
If the settlement was "low," the plaintiff loses; he or she cannot recover the
difference in noneconomic damages from the remaining defendants. If the
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of settling for a high amount and the certainty of immediate recovery
against the possibility of loss." Furthermore, a non-settling defendant
contributes nothing to the settlement process and has no equitable claim
to the benefits of a high settlement.76
Although disallowing setoff will sometimes permit plaintiffs to
receive more than the total amount of damages, this approach comports
with the notion that settlement dollars represent more than mere
damages.77 The settling tortfeasor, in effect, contracts with the plaintiff
to "buy his peace"78 and avoid the expense of trial.79 Thus, the plaintiff does not receive a windfall, but instead merely reaps the benefits of
a good bargain. Also, it is the plaintiff who bears the risk of recovering
less at trial.8"
Furthermore, the single-recovery rule8' had its roots in an era in
which courts did not understand how to apportion liability among
defendants and a plaintiffs injury was considered indivisible. 2 Today,

settlement was "high," as here, the plaintiff wins; he or she retains the benefit of
the settlement bargain as well as receiving the amounts allocated by the jury to the
nonsettling defendants. The nonsettling defendants bear no risk and can reap no
benefit from divergence; the settlement does not affect their liability for
noneconomic damages.
Id.
The Hoch court also advanced another argument as to why the setoff provisions should not
apply. Id. at 623. The court pointed out that one of the reasons why joint and several liability
was abolished was to partially eliminate the "deep pockets rule," which sometimes left a
defendant that was only slightly at fault responsible for paying most or all of the damage award.
Id. Holding each defendant only liable to the degree that each defendant is at fault guards
against "deep pocket rule" inequities. Id.
75. David Kikel, Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties,and Settlements,
65 CAL. L. REV. 1264, 1278 (1977). The author notes that allowing the plaintiff to retain the
benefits from a high settlement presents the plaintiff with options similar to those presented to
the plaintiff injured by a single tortfeasor. Id. In those cases, most plaintiffs settle their claims.
Id. The results should not differ when the plaintiff is faced with multiple tortfeasors. Id.
76. Id. at 1279 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE 152-55 (1951); Arthur Larson, A Problem in Contribution: The Tortfeasorwith an
Individual Defense Against the Injured Party, 1940 WiS. L. REV. 467, 486-91).
77. See Kikel, supra note 75, at 1279; Neil, 859 P.2d at 206.
78. Kikel, supra note 75, at 1279.
79. Neil, 859 P.2d at 206.
80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
81. See Neil, 859 P.2d at 207. The single-recovery rule credited defendants for the amount
paid in settlement to prevent the plaintiff from recovering more than the total amount of
damages. Id.
82. See Hoch, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625; Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,
431 (Tex. 1984).
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under comparative negligence statutes,8 3 courts routinely determine
each defendant's share of liability.84 Thus, a settlement with one
defendant does not change the harm caused by other defendants."
Therefore, a settlement with one defendant should not change the
liability of other defendants. 6
Analyzing the alternative approaches to the setoff statutes in relation
to the comparative negligence statute further illustrates that the court in
the instant case may have followed the most logical method in
harmonizing these statutes. The court could have followed the
88 Under this
suggestion of Justice Grimes in footnote three of Fabre ."
89
method, the "settlement-first" method, the total amount of damages,
both economic and non-economic, is reduced by the total amount of
settlements paid.' ° Then, the liability of the non-settling defendants is
determined by his or her share of fault.9 This was the method employed by the appellate court below in the instant case.' The problem
is that the non-settling defendant and not the plaintiff is allowed to reap
the benefits of a high settlement.93
Alternatively, the court could have first reduced the total amount of
damages by the comparative fault of all other parties and nonparties and
subtracted the settlement from the reduced amount.9 4 Yet, this method,
known as the "fault-first" method,95 results in a double reduction for
the plaintiff and adversely affects the plaintiff's right to fair compensation.9 6
Under the method used by the instant court, the non-settling
defendant was liable for 90% of the plaintiff's noneconomic damages,
83. See, e.g., supra note 18.
84. See, e.g., Fabre II, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
85. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 431.
86. Id.
87. See Thomas S. Edwards, Jr. & Sarah H. Sharp, FabrelAllied-Signal/Dosdourian
Trilogy: Questions Answered, More Created, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1994, at 22, 28.
88. Id. at 27; see supra note 53.
89. Edwards & Sharp, supra note 87, at 27.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Wells 1, 634 So. 2d at 659. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $573,853,
which, when added to court costs, makes up a sum of $582,853. Id. at 659 n.6. Under the
method used by the Wells I court, the $300,000 settlement and the $17,000 social security offset
is subtracted, leaving the sole non-settling defendant with a balance of $265,853. Id.
93. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
94. Edwards & Sharp, supra note 87, at 27.
95. Id.
96. Id. Had the instant court employed this method, the court would have reduced the total
amount of damages by 10%, the comparative fault of the settling parties. Then, the court would

have subtracted the $300,000 settlement from the modified amount.
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regardless of the settlement amount.97 Thus, the plaintiff was able to
reap the benefits of a high settlement, the non-settling defendant was not
permitted to take advantage of the good faith efforts of the settling
defendants, and the non-settling defendant was responsible for its
apportioned share of damages, no more and no less. Thus, the instant
court made the decision that seemed most equitable. The only remaining
question appears to be the one raised by Justice Anstead's concurring
opinion with respect to the continued viability of the setoff statutes.98
However, as Justice Anstead points out, there are limited instances in
which these statutes still apply.99 Specifically, the statutes are still
applicable to economic damages since joint and several liability still
exists with respect to economic damages.'"
The instant court's harmonization of the comparative negligence
statute with the setoff statutes has finally given some guidance to
plaintiffs and defendants wanting to know how pre-trial settlements will
affect post-trial apportionment of damages. Given several options, the
court chose to follow the rule advanced in other jurisdictions that
abolishes joint and several liability.' In so doing, the court chose to
allow the plaintiff rather than a non-settling defendant to reap the
benefit of a high settlement. This decision not only encourages
settlement but also conforms to the legislature's decision to abolish joint
and several liability.

97. Wells II, 659 So. 2d at 254.
98. Id. at 255-56 (Anstead, J., concurring). Indeed, one could argue that by leaving the
"setoff statutes" intact, the legislature intended them to have continued application to noneconomic damages, as well. In enacting the comparative negligence statute, the legislature might
have been merely trying to eliminate situations in which parties with low percentages of fault
were forced to pay all or nearly all of the damages. See also Walt Disney World, 515 So. 2d at
199 (holding that one defendant, determined by the jury to be 1% at fault, must pay 86% of the
full damages awarded). The legislature may not have contemplated disallowing setoff and
arguably thereby authorizing a plaintiff to receive a windfall in the event of a settlement with
one defendant that is high in relation to the fault later apportioned to the settling defendant at
trial.
99. Wells II, 659 So. 2d at 256 (Anstead, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 253-54.
101. Id. at 251-52.
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